Weight equality is perhaps the most debated opinion on the epistemic importance of differences of opinion. Competing views of peer disputes are better understood as a rejection of different aspects of weight equality, so it is an appropriate place to begin our review. From our point of view, the Equal Weight View is a combination of three requirements: the Equal Weight View was also motivated by analogies. Analogies with thermometers are of particular importance. Thermometers take information as inputs and indicate certain temperature stops as outputs. People are a kind of cognitive machine that, in different types of information, takes as inputs and gives doxastic settings as outputs. In this way, people and thermometers are similar. Support for equal weight has come out of the scrutiny, which would be reasonable to believe in a case of even thermometer discord. Suppose you and I know that we have equally reliable thermometers, and when we look at the ambient temperature, we discover that our thermometers give different outputs (you read “75” and mine is “72`). What is reasonable for us to believe in room temperature? It seems irrational for me to continue to believe that there were 72 just because it was the power of the thermometer that I was holding. Similarly, it seems irrational to me to believe that your thermometer is defective simply because my thermometer gave a different power. It seems that I would need some information regardless of this “disunity” to deconstruct your thermometer.
So it seems that I have been given a reason to believe that the ambient temperature is not 72 years old, learning from your thermometer that this reason is as strong as my reason to believe that it is 72, and that this reason will be overcome only by independent considerations. If the analogy applies, we have reason to accept each of the three theses of equality. Note that the problem does not come from a simple lack of consensus. Very few beliefs, if any, are free from disagreement. On the contrary, the skeptical threat stems both from the magnitude of disagreements (conditions (i) and ii) and from the nature of the parties in conflict (conditions (iii) – (viii)). Although not all beliefs meet these conditions, which are recognized by controversy, many do, and among those who do, some of our most valued beliefs. Lynch M (2010) Epistemic Circularity and epistemic disagreement. In: Haddock A, Millar A, Pritchard D (eds) Social epistemology. Oxford University Press, Oxford Defeat has been rejected by Steadfast View advocates in many ways.
First, Defeat was rejected by a call for private evidence. Peter van Inwagen (1996) defended Steadfast`s view that, in cases of party disagreements, uncommunicative discernment or particular evidence that the other party lacks. The basic idea is that if I have access to a special body of evidence that my peer does not have access to, then realize that my peer does not agree with me, I have no reason to think I made a mistake. After all, my peer doesn`t have everything I need to do to evaluate ” (P)” and it may be reasonable to think that if the peer knew everything I know, she would also share my opinion on this subject. In addition, some evidence is undoubtedly private. While I can talk to my peer about my intuitions or experiences, I can`t give him my intuitions or experiences. Our limitations never allow their peers to pass on their evidence. However, if the evidence is not fully shared, my peer, who analyzes his evidence in one way or another, does not need to show that I misjudged my evidence. Our evidence is very different. While Van Inwagen`s assertions may lead to the conflicting two parties not being peers because of their differences of evidence, these considerations can be used to resist defeat, at least in more lax peerhood conceptions, which do not require equal evidence.